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Case Notes
Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children
in State Welfare Programs
No one will deny that for centuries society has placed a heavy
burden upon those children branded as "illegitimate." The United
States Supreme Court has made another step in its efforts to lighten
this burden in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill.1
The scope of this note is to evaluate the significance of this case in
light of previous decisions and to arrive at the present state of the
law as it deals with illegitimacy and the Equal Protection Clause.
The Cahill case dealt with a New Jersey statute entitled "Assist-
ance to Families of the Working Poor."'2 The specific aspect of the
statute that was challenged provided that welfare benefits would
be limited to only those qualified families "which consist of a
household composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially
married to each other who have at least one minor child . . . of
both, the natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a child
adopted by both... "3 The basis of the action was that the statute
invariably discriminated against the illegitimate in practical appli-
cation.4 At first, a single judge of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey dismissed the class action because
1. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
2. N.J.S. 44:13-1 et seq.
3. N.J.S. 44:13-3 (a).
4. 411U.S. 619 (1973).
no substantial constitutional question was presented. 5 The United
States Court of Appeals remanded the case to a three judge court
for determination of the equal protection question.6
After upholding the statute, the decision of the three judge court
was reversed by a majority of the Supreme Court with Chief Jus-
tice Burger concurring in the result and Justice Rehnquist dis-
senting.7
In reviewing the history of the development of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, it is intersting to note that one legal writer felt
that the Court avoided constitutional questions in the area of
illegitimacy as it relates to welfare legislation.8 For example, in
the area of social welfare, discrimination against illegitimates was
first held to be merely against "federal public welfare policy" ex-
pressed in the Social Security Act.9 However, the court began to
deal with the constitutional issues in Levy v. Louisiana.10 This
case held that illegitimate children could not be barred from su-
ing for the wrongful death of a parent when such right was given
to legitimate children." One legal writer observed that Levy was
the opening wedge in the long accepted discrimination against il-
legitimate children. 12 Levy was cited as authority for the Cahill
decision.13
The next step in the development of the law in this area was
Davis v. Richardson.'4 Davis held that giving legitimate children
priority in receiving benefits under the Social Security Act was
"invidious discrimination.' 5 Citing Gomez v. Perez,16 the ma-
jority in Cahill recalled that once the right of support from the na-
tural father is given to a legitimate child, there is no constitutional
justification for denying the same right to the illegitimate child.' 7
However, the case most heavily relied upon by the majority in
Cahill was Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Insurance Co.' 8 Weber
dealt with a workman's compensation statute that gave prior-
5. Id. at 620n.
6. 448 F.2d 1247 (1971).
7. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
8. Annot., 388 A.L.R.3d 613, 634 (1971).
9. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 324-26 (1968).
10. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
11. 411 U.S. 619,620 (1973).
12. Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimacy, Inheritance and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 75 Dick. L. Rev. 377, 378 (1971).
13. 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973).
14. 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
15. Id. at 593.
16. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
17. 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973).
18. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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ity to legitimate children for the primary benefits under the statute,
leaving only the residual benefits, if any, to the illegitimate chil-
dren by classifying them as "other dependents."'19 Although the
Court in Weber held that the discrimination was less than it was in
Levy, it was "impermissible discrimination. '20  There was some
implication in Weber that classifications based upon illegitimacy
were subject to strict scrutiny.21 But, as pointed out by Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Weber, the majority did not expressly state
that illegitimacy was a "suspect" classification, but rather formu-
lated a "hybrid standard. ' 22 The majority in Cahill included the
following quote from Weber:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of mar-
riage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegit-
imate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relation to individual responsi-
bility or wrong doing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his
birth and penalizing the illegitimate is an ineffectual-as well as
unjust-way of deterring the parent.23
The three judge court that first decided the constitutional question
in Cahill24 used many of the cases cited by the Supreme Court,
but reached a different conclusion. The lower court stated that
Weber has impliedly made illegitimacy a "suspect" classification by
subjecting it to "strict scrutiny. '25 But the lower court cited two
cases, Labine v. Vincent2 6 and Dandridge v. Williams 27 that the
majority of the Supreme Court did not consider in their opinion.
Labine upheld an intestate succession statute that prevented il-
legitimate children from becoming heirs at law. Labine recog-
nized the state's right to regulate succession of property and "to
make rules to establish, protect and strengthen family life."'28 Other
justifications used for upholding classifications, such as this, have
19. Id. at 168.
20. Id. at 169.
21. Id. at 172.
22. Id. at 181.
23. 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973).
24. 349 F. Supp. 491 (D.N.J. 1972).
25. Id. at 495.
26. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
27. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
28. 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
been that it eliminates difficult proof problems in regard to patern-
ity, and it discourages promiscuity. 29
Dandridge,3 0 which the lower court relied upon in Cahill, is one
of the pivotal cases in determining the rights of the illegitimate
child. A Maryland statute set an absolute maximum on welfare
benefits to be received by any particular family, regardless of
the size of the family. When a family reached a specified number
of children, it could no longer claim welfare benefits in proportion
to its size. It was argued that the new born child which caused
the family to exceed the specified size was deprived of equal pro-
tection of the law. The court held that the classification was based
upon the family unit rather than the child, and there was clearly
a rational basis for the classification.3 1 Note the language of the
court:
... the Constitution does not impower this court to second guess
state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public funds among a myriad of potential recipients.3 2
The significance of Dandridge is the laxity the Supreme Court ex-
ercises when there is discrimination against a legitimate child.
No doubt Dandridge was cited as authority for the lower court de-
cision because the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children was not realized.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent to the Supreme Court's decision
in Cahill, agreed with the lower court in regard to Dandridge being
controlling.8 3 Justice Rehnquist states:
It does not seem to me irrational in establishing such a special
program to condition the receipt of such grants on the sort of cere-
monial marriage that could quite reasonably be found to be an
essential ingredient of the family unit . . . The Constitution does
not require that special financial assistance be designed by the
legislature to help poor families be extended to "communes" as
well.3 4
Justice Rehnquist further shows his preference for the rational basis
test when he states:
In the area of economics and social welfare, the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the state from taking one step at a time
in attempting to overcome a social ill, provided only that the
classifications made by the state are rational.3 5
29. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MUCH. L. REv. 477,
489-91 (1966).
30. 349 F. Supp. 491, 495 (D.N.J. 1972).
31. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
32. Id. at 487.
33. 411 U.S. 619, 623 (1973).
34. Id. at 622.
35. Id. at 622-23.
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One question that arises is, why did Justice Rehnquist not use
Labine to strengthen his position? As previously discussed, Labine
is probably the strongest recent authority that upholds a classifica-
tion based upon illegitimacy. It seems logical that the stability of
the family justification would fit the Cahill situation better than
Labine itself. One legal writer gives the answer to this question
by saying that Labine was a five to four decision that was merely
a temporary set back in regard to the Constitutional rights of il-
legitimate children.3 6 The fact that neither Justice Rehnquist nor
the majority in Cahill felt that Labine was worth mentioning casts
serious doubts about its precendential value.
With Labine having apparently fallen by the wayside, the prob-
lem of reconciling Cahill with Dandridge still remains. Both cases
dealt with state supported welfare programs. In practical effect,
both deprive children of welfare benefits; i.e. the Maryland statute
in Dandridge deprived the last born child when the family number
exceeded the maximum, and the New Jersey statute in Cahill de-
prived children whose parents were not married. Why was the
statute in Dandridge valid and the statute in Cahill invalid?
The only distinction that readily comes to mind is that the latter
classification discriminated against illegitimate children as opposed
to legitimate children in the former. It seems clear that the court
deals with illegitimacy differently. If Cahill had used the same test
as Dandridge, surely some set of facts could be conceived to pro-
vide a rational basis for the New Jersey statute.37 Consider the
conclusion of the Supreme Court in Cahill:
... for there can be no doubt that the benefits extended under
the challenged program are as indispensable to the health and
well-being of the illegitimate children as to those who are legiti-
mate.38
Why would this reasoning not apply to the last born child in Dand-
ridge? The answer seems clear that where illegitimacy is involved
as a classification, a different test is applied.
But what is this new test? The lower court in Cahill felt
it was the "strict scrutiny" test implied from Weber. 9  Justice
36. Petrillo, supra n. 14 at 379.
37. 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
38. 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973).
39. 349 F. Supp. 491, 495 (D.N.J. 1972).
Rehnquist's dissent in Weber alleged that the majority spoke of
"strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" but in effect applied a hy-
brid test somewhere in between these two traditional equal pro-
tection tests.40
Perhaps illegitimacy has been in a state of transition between the
rational basis test and the "strict scrutiny" test reserved for "sus-
pect" classifications. In light of the Cahill decision, it appears that
the transition is nearing completion, if not complete already.
PHILLIP NORTH
40. 406 U.S. 164, 181 (1972).
